Theoretical analysis of the overburden costs for operations peacekeeping United Nations

Economic theory alliances is one of the tools used to analyze the overwhelming costs of the UN peacekeeping operations. Economic theory alliances has been proposed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Major research topics in this area are military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), focusing on the analysis of shared responsibility for public goods, in particular potential deterrent. Peace and security that the United Nations seeks to materialize by such means as the operations of peacekeeping are typical of public property. A common point between operations for peacekeeping from the United Nations and military alliances is burden-sharing between countries producing public goods, so that the economic theory of alliances is regarded as an effective tool of analysis. But it is also true that there are significant transactions between peacekeeping and military alliances, to incorporate the differences between the analysis model creates greater understanding at the same time keeping operations UN peacekeepers as an international public good and cost-sharing.

The most distinctive difference between keeping operations UN peacekeepers and military alliances such as NATO is an urgency. In many cases, the operations of peacekeeping United Nations must respond promptly to the changing situation in a region of the dispute and it is possible for the dead to rise significantly as a result of delays of a few months to achieve at resolutions to establish operations peacekeeping by the Security Council or for the forces of peace-keeping action. From this aspect, the operations of peacekeeping United Nations are more similar in kind to emergency assistance for regions suffering from natural calamities such as earthquakes to peace than military alliances.

The second characteristic of difference between the operations of peacekeeping UN and military alliances is the diversity of member countries. NATO currently has 26 members, all of a few in North America and Europe, while the United Nations, as its name suggests, has members throughout the world, with 191 member countries in 2004. Operations peacekeeping United Nations are established after the accident or termination of disputes, in order to stabilize regions of disputes. In the case of public welfare, regional stability, as indicated above, countries in the evaluation studies of the benefits differ depending on the geographic locations of the regions of conflict and economic and political relations with the regions dispute, which is different from deterring potential generated by military alliances in peacetime. The diversity among the countries gives rise to a great disparity in scores.

A third difference is the great inequality in income among members. Eight of the 191 UN member countries, namely the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China, Italy and Canada, account for about 70 percent of global income, while 45 African member countries located in the south or the Sahara desert account for only about 1 percent, and 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, only about 5 percent.

According Olson (1969), in order to materialize pareto optimal level for the provision of public goods, it is necessary to materialize tax equity, whereby entities that enjoy the benefits of public property agreement with the entities that determine the level of provision of public property and the cost of the service. In the case of entities that comprise it for only part of the former entities, which means that tax equity is not achieved, there will be a spillover benefits that will cause inadequate supply of public goods. An example of this is the military power of the members of the military alliance. Therefore, in the case of military alliances, it is important to address the ineffectiveness of measures for the implementation of the external economy. On the other hand, for the operations of peacekeeping by the United Nations, it is possible that the results achieved by pursuing tax equity would be unacceptable from the point of view of impartiality because of three differences described above. For UN peacekeeping operations, the developed countries are making contributions commensurate with their economic power, rather than depending on the level of services they enjoy. The proof is that the burden on member countries to cover most of the costs of operations for peacekeeping are based on the countries' economic size. Taking into account the above, the way to address the issue of impartiality is important in the analysis of the increasing costs of UN peacekeeping operations.